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Abstract
Because of bacterial resistance, current antibiotic consumption is rein-
forced by past use, and future utility is lower. The purpose of this article is
to provide evidence on habit and addictive behavior toward antibiotics by
exploring variations in the average consumption of antibiotics across 20 Ital-
ian regions. Using a balanced panel dataset (2000-2009), we estimate myopic
and rational addiction models in which antibiotic consumption depends upon
demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the population, the supply
of health care in the community, antibiotic price, and the capital stockof
endogenous bacterial resistance measured by past and future consumption.
Our empirical evidence shows that past antibiotic consumption stimulates
current consumption and is also consistent with the rational addiction hy-
pothesis. The low price elasticity of antibiotic demand suggests that policy
measures targeted at antibiotic co-payments may not be e¤ective in control-
ling antibiotic consumption. There is scope for other policy interventions,
such as incentives and information campaigns targeted at doctors.
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1 Introduction
Antibiotic misuse increases the threat of bacterial resistance, which in turn reduces
antibiotic e¤ectiveness over time (Elbasha, 2003; Laxminarayan and Brown, 2001).
It has been suggested that e¤orts to restrict antibiotic use in outpatients have
not been very successful since no central agent, such as a hospital administrator
or infection control committee, can enforce an antibiotic policy (Harbarth and
Samore, 2005). Understanding of the dynamics of antibiotic consumption may
help shape appropriate measures of public intervention to optimize the use of
antimicrobials. The empirical literature is lacking in this respect.
Recent theoretical studies on the economics of antibiotics suggest that con-
sumers make inter-temporal decisions. To some extent, antibiotics are similar to
addictive goods since individuals may develop dependence or experience persis-
tent attitudes toward consumption. Also, current antibiotic consumption may be
a¤ected by past consumption because of endogenous bacterial resistance. Static
empirical models of antibiotic demand do not consider the process of adjustment
toward optimal levels of antibiotic consumption.
The mechanism of transmission of antimicrobial resistance is described by the
basic SIS epidemiological model, which is used, for instance, in recent theoretical
studies by Herrmann and Gaudet, 2009 and Wilen and Msangi, 2003. The SIS
model assumes that the population is partitioned into infected individuals and
individuals in good health. Uninfected individuals can become infected through
contact with the infected population and individuals can be infected by a drug-
resistant strain or a drug-susceptible strain. The transmission of drug-resistant
strains to healthy individuals depends on the number and the speed of contacts
among individuals. Some individuals infected with a drug-resistant strain natu-
rally recover, but the rate of recovery for those treated with antibiotics remains
unchanged.
In this paper, we propose a dynamic approach to investigate antibiotic use
in outpatient care that hypothesizes that antibiotic consumption is a¤ected by
antibiotic ine¢ cacy, i.e., the stock of bacterial resistance to antimicrobials. The
level of ine¢ cacy represents a bad that is indirectly measurable by means of past
and future antibiotic use.
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Individuals may be myopic in the sense that the e¤ect of present antibiotic
consumption on future consumption is not taken into account in their consump-
tion choices. In this case, past consumption is presumed to a¤ect present con-
sumption only through the reduced level of antibiotic e¤ectiveness. Conversely,
patients may be aware of future implications of antibiotic use in terms of reduced
antibiotic e¤ectiveness. The plausibility of this assumption is also supported by
the trust patients place in their doctors, whose superior knowledge of the im-
plications of antibiotic treatment drives patientsdecisions. This may imply that
addiction to antibiotics is rational. If consumersperceived benets from antibiotic
prescriptions outweigh the small uncertain costs associated with increased resis-
tance (Brown and Layton, 1996), rational agents may not restrain from increasing
consumption over time.
To investigate consumersbehavior, we explore myopic and rational models
of habit and addiction to antibiotics. This represents the main novelty of our
analysis and provides a signicant contribution to the existing empirical literature
on antibiotic consumption. We focus on variations in the average consumption of
antibiotics across 20 Italian regions using a balanced panel between 2000 and 2009.
Estimations are carried out by means of suitable approaches for short dynamic
panels.
Our ndings support the hypothesis of habit to antibiotic consumption and
reject the myopic model in favor of the rational addiction model. Since short-
and long-run price elasticity estimates are found to be relatively low, we suggest
that increasing copayments may not be a valid instrument to reduce antibiotic
consumption and control bacterial resistance. There is scope for other policy
measures based on incentives for physicians and information campaigns targeting
doctors and patients.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an
overview of aspects of antibiotic demand and discusses models of habit and ad-
diction to antibiotics. In Section 3 we derive our empirical model of demand for
antibiotics and discuss the estimation approach. Section 4 presents the results
and Section 5 concludes.
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2 The dynamics of antibiotic consumption
2.1 Physician versus patient
The Italian healthcare system is based upon a national health service (SSN)
mainly nanced by general taxation and characterized by universal access to
health care for the entire population and asymmetric decentralization of health
care provision to the 20 regions. The regions allocate nancial resources to the
local health authorities (LHAs) within their territories. Patients are registered
with GP practices within their province of residence. Antibiotics are prescribed
by general practitioners (GPs) operating within the LHA and by pediatricians
and specialists.
Antibiotic consumption requires a doctors consultation, but usually patients
do not pay for visits. Patients directly pay a small fraction of the full cost of
drugs (copayment). The copayment - ticket - includes both a cost-sharing
scheme and a reference pricing scheme. According to these, patients are required
to contribute to the cost of antibiotics either by a xed amount per prescription
or by a proportional-to-nal price amount, or by paying the di¤erence between
the nal price and the reference price. The reference price is set for drugs that
contain the same active ingredient, identical pharmaceutical dosage and package
size.
2.2 Information and incentives
Antibiotic treatment cures patients a¤ected by common bacterial infections and
signicantly reduces recovery time.1 Antibiotics also have external benets since
they are similar to preventive care. In this sense, the use of antibiotics may
contribute to reducing the spread of bacterial infections to other individuals, which
increases future social benets from consumption.
Although direct monetary costs of antibiotic treatment (copayment) are rela-
tively low, antibiotic consumption is characterized by non-monetary and external
costs. Current antibiotic use may increase the stock of bacterial resistance, which
1A recent survey by the European Commission (2010) indicates that the majority of the
Italian population (51%) thinks that antibiotics are e¤ective against common infections, such as
colds or u, which are not cured by antibiotics.
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in turn reduces the e¤ectiveness of antibiotics over time (Elbasha, 2003).
Although patients appear to be poorly informed about future costs and ben-
ets of antibiotic consumption, doctors advice may recognize the full price of
addictive antibiotic consumption. The full cost of antibiotic treatment, which
includes the monetary price as well as the future cost of reduced e¤ectiveness
due to past consumption, could then be weighed against the benets of antibiotic
consumption.
2.3 Alternative models of antibiotics demand
2.3.1 Static models
Static models of antibiotic consumption ignore the link between consumerspref-
erences in di¤erent time periods. They assume that a change in current con-
sumption a¤ects consumersutility in the current period only and that consumers
do not respond to changes in past consumption. Consequently, consumption in
di¤erent periods is fully separable. This implies that individuals instantaneously
adjust to the optimal level of consumption while also taking bacterial resistance
into account.
Consider a simple model in which utility depends on the consumption of a
composite good, ct, the consumption of antibiotics, at, and the level of bacterial
resistance, Rt. Individuals maximize the following utility function:
Ut = u(ct; at;Rt), (1)
under the usual budget constraint.
Static models of antibiotic demand exploit cross-sectional data. Usually, data
on bacterial resistance are unavailable. Filippini et al. (2006) propose an econo-
metric model in which antibiotic use across 26 Swiss cantons varies according to
the socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of the population, the inci-
dence of infections, the local supply of health care, and antibiotic price. Findings
suggest that antibiotic consumption is signicantly related to per capita income,
antibiotic price, the density of medical pactices, and demographic, cultural, and
educational factors. Kern et al. (2006) investigate variations in antibiotic prescrip-
tions across 23 areas in 16 German states in relation to age, population density,
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income, unemployment, and aspects of local health care supply. Regional patterns
of use are similar for children and adults, although lower levels of consumption
for children are observed in southern regions. The study does not nd any sig-
nicant association between antibiotic consumption and population density, the
percentage of elderly people, income, unemployment, gross domestic product, and
aspects of local healthcare supply. Matuz et al. (2005) explore regional variations
in antibiotic consumption in ambulatory care in Hungary. The authors do not
nd any signicant relationship between antibiotic consumption and the average
monthly net income or the demographic structure of the population. Conversely,
a signicant association is observed between antibiotic consumption and the pro-
portion of individuals receiving free access to selected medicines from the public
health system without quantity limits and the proportion of individuals regularly
receiving social assistance. Finally, Filippini et al. (2009) estimate an econometric
model of the demand for antibiotics using data from 240 small areas in Switzer-
land. The results suggest a positive relationship between antibiotic consumption
and income, the proportion of children between 0 and 14 years of age, and the
density of pharmacies and physicians. On the other hand, antibiotic price and the
proportion of individuals over 74 years of age show a signicant negative impact
on antibiotic use.
To our knowledge, the only study that utilizes panel data and includes bacte-
rial resistance among explanatory variables is the recent investigation by Masiero
et al. (2010) on socioeconomic determinants of antibiotic use in Europe. The
population income, demographic structure, density of general practitioners, and
their remuneration method appear to be signicant determinants of antibiotic con-
sumption. The responsiveness of antibiotic use to changes in bacterial resistance
is found to be relatively low, between 0:09 and 0:18. A limitation of this study is
that the process of adjustment toward optimal levels of antibiotic consumption is
neglected.
2.3.2 Models of myopic addiction
Recent theoretical studies on the economics of antibiotics assume inter-temporal
decisions (Laxminarayan and Weitzman, 2002; Herrmann, 2010). Although the
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empirical literature is replete with studies on endogenous tastes in the consump-
tion of cigarettes and alcohol (e.g., Chaloupka, 1991; Jones, 1994; Baltagi and
Gri¢ n, 2001; Hidayat and Thabrany, 2010), the investigation of the dynamics of
antibiotic consumption is lacking.
In a model of addiction to antibiotics as habit formation, greater past con-
sumption of antibiotics increases the desire for present consumption. This repre-
sents the so-called reinforcement condition required for addiction, which suggests
that individuals who have undergone antibiotic treatment in the past are more
likely to consider the use of antibiotics in the current period.2 However, indi-
viduals ignore the future benets and costs of their decisions and are, therefore,
myopic. The hypothesis of myopic behavior in the consumption of antibiotics
could be plausible for a number of reasons. Patients and their doctors may not be
fully aware of the future harmful consequences of current antibiotic consumption.
This is because limited information is available on the levels of antimicrobial resis-
tance, and agents may not be able to evaluate correctly the impact of resistance on
future antibiotic e¢ cacy. Patients may not be aware of studies that demonstrate
conclusively that prior use of antibiotics increases a persons risk of acquiring a
resistance infection (Laxminarayan, 2001).
Assume that past antibiotic consumption is a measure of antibiotics ine¢ cacy,
i.e., the stock of bacterial resistance, Rt. The variation in antibiotic e¢ cacy over
time, Rt=t, depends on the consumption of antibiotics and the depreciation
rate of the stock of bacterial resistance, , - the rate at which bacteria regress
to the susceptibility state in the absence of antibiotic treatment, also called the
tness cost of resistance -. The stock of bacterial resistance can then evolve
2This may be explained by some physical or psychological e¤ects which persist over time.
It may also reect physiciansattitudes toward antibiotic prescriptions. Under uncertainty on
the nature of patients infection, antibiotic therapy may appear to have been benecial even
though patientsrelief was not due to the treatment. General practitioners may prefer antibiotic
therapies since they were presumably e¤ective in the past or patients are not willing to wait for
recovery.
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according to the following relationship:3
Rt = (1  )Rt 1 + at 1. (2)
This stock adjustment condition relates the stock of habit to the consump-
tion of antibiotics. Although this stock depends on antibiotic consumption, it is
redened to represent the inuence of bacterial resistance.4
2.3.3 Rational addiction and time preferences
The main insights of rational addictive behavior are theoretically derived by
Becker and Murphy (1988). A sizable empirical literature compares myopic and
rational models of addictive behavior (e.g., Luo et al., 2003; Tiezzi, 2005).
In the case of antibiotics, rational individuals are aware that higher levels of
antibiotic consumption decrease future utility, given the amount of future con-
sumption (tolerance condition for addiction). Rational consumers weigh current
benet from consumption against the future health consequences in terms of the
risk of antibiotic ine¢ cacy and the future costs of purchasing new antibiotics.
For instance, since endogenous bacterial resistance reduces antibiotic e¢ cacy over
time, individuals know that more therapies have to be considered before nding
the one e¤ective in curing the infection.5
Following Becker and Murphy (1988), we can extend Eq. 1 to write the lifetime
utility function of rational agents with a constant rate of time preference, , as:
1X
t=1
t 1Ut, (3)
where  = 1=(1 + r) and r is the interest rate.
In Eq. 3, forward-looking agents are assumed to be time consistent. This
means that current preferences regarding future behavior are in accordance with
3This simple relationship assumes that the e¤ects on antibiotic e¢ cacy generated by the con-
sumption of other agents are negligible or hidden from consumers. However, bacterial resistance
generated by other agents may also represent a constraint. Although bacterial resistance plau-
sibly spreads within regions, i.e., it is a local phenomenon, researchers have hypothesized some
global e¤ects (Rudholm, 2002).
4See Jones (1999) for an interpretation of stocks of habits in state adjustment models.
5Throughout the paper, we assume that individuals make decisions on antibiotic consumption
following the advice of their doctors, as suggested above in Section 2.2. We hypothesize that
doctors are perfect agents and patients are compliant with the prescribed antibiotic therapy.
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this behavior. The assumption has been challenged by Gruber and Köszegi (2001)
who extended the analysis to time inconsistency. Antibiotic consumption under
time-inconsistent preferences would indicate, for instance, that individuals state
that they agree with a more careful use of antibiotics and are aware of costly impli-
cations of bacterial resistance. Nevertheless, they are unable to act in accordance
with this view and ignore these aspects in their future choices of consumption.6
3 Model specication and econometric approach
For our empirical approach, we simplify the dynamic equation 2 and assume that
bacterial resistance fully depreciates after one period, i.e.  = 1. Using (1) and
(2), we can then write the lifetime utility function (3) as:
1X
t=1
t 1u (ct; at; at 1; et) , (4)
where et represents the impact of unmeasured life-cycle variables on utility.
Following Becker et. al. (1994), we can dene the maximization constraint as:
a0 = a
0 and
1X
t=1
t 1 (ct + Ptat) = A0, (5)
where Pt is antibiotic co-payment at period t, a0 is the initial condition indicating
the level of antibiotic consumption at period zero, and A0 is the present value of
wealth.
The rst-order conditions to solve the problem above imply that the marginal
utility of current antibiotic consumption plus the discounted marginal e¤ect on
the next periods utility of current consumption is equal to the marginal utility of
wealth multiplied by the current co-payment. Furthermore, the marginal utility
of wealth equals the marginal utility of the composite good in each period. Using
a quadratic utility function, the solution of the rst-order conditions leads to the
following rst-di¤erence equation:
at = at 1 + at+1 + 1Pt + 2et + 3et+1. (6)
6Two extreme kinds of agents, naive and sophisticated, are of interest. Naive agents attach
extra value to antibiotic consumption in the current period relative to future periods but are
unaware of their future inability to use antibiotics more carefully. Conversely, sophisticated
patients realize that they are time-inconsistent.
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In this equation, current antibiotic consumption is a function of past and
future consumption, co-payment, and unobservable variables. The  coe¢ cients
depend on the parameters of the quadratic utility function. For further details
see Baltagi and Gri¢ n (2001). A comprehensive discussion on the interpretation
and the derivation of Eq. 6 can be found in Becker et al. (1994).
To empirically investigate the dynamics of antibiotic consumption, we modify
the rst-di¤erence equation 6, as in Baltagi and Gri¢ n (2002), and write the
following equation:
ait = 0 + 1ait 1 + 2ait+1 + 3Pit + 4Yit + 5POP1it + 6POP3it
+7DPOPit + 8DPHit + 9INFit + 10IMMit + vit, (7)
where ait is the level of antibiotic use in the ith region (i = 1; :::; 20) at time t,
measured in dened daily doses per 1000 inhabitants; Yit is real GDP per capita,
and POP1it and POP3it denote respectively the percentage of the population
below 14 and above 74. DPOPit is population density and DPHit is the density
of physician practices. Finally, INFit captures the rate of infectious diseases,
IMMit denotes the rate of working permits for foreign workers, and it is a
disturbance term.
From Eq. 7 one can obtain the discount rate () as the ratio between the
estimated coe¢ cient of at+1 (2) and the estimated coe¢ cient of at 1 (1). The
coe¢ cient 1 captures the impact of past consumption on current consumption.
Consequently, a positive and signicant coe¢ cient is consistent with the hypothe-
sis that antibiotic use is a habit or addictive behavior. The coe¢ cient 2 measures
the impact of future consumption on current consumption. A positive and signif-
icant coe¢ cient would be consistent with the hypothesis of rational addiction and
would support rejecting the hypothesis of myopic addiction.
One can easily limit the focus to myopic consumers by combining Eqs. 1 and
2. Myopic agents maximize current period utility instead of the lifetime utility
function (3), under the assumption that current antibiotic consumption is a¤ected
by past consumption as hypothesized by (2). A myopic model of addiction can
be derived from (7) by dropping the lead term at+1:
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ait = 0 + 1ait 1 + 2Pit + 3Yit + 4POP1it + 5POP3it
+6DPOPit + 7DPHit + 8INFit + 9IMMit + vit. (8)
For the estimation of myopic and rational models of addiction to antibiotics,
we have a balanced panel data set for the 20 Italians regions. To account for
unobserved heterogeneity, we could use a xed e¤ects (LSDV) or a random e¤ects
(RE) model. However, the estimation of the dynamic panel data models (7)-(8)
using LSDV or RE estimators is not appropriate. This is because the inclusion
of lagged and lead-dependent variables among regressors violates the strict ex-
ogeneity assumption. In fact, lagged and lead variables are correlated with the
error term, which leads to biased and inconsistent estimates of LSDV and RE.7
In the literature, several instrumental variable estimators have been proposed to
solve this problem. Anderson and Hsiao (1982) proposed a simple instrumen-
tal variable estimator. Arellano and Bond (1991) as well as Blundell and Bond
(1998) proposed two di¤erent estimators based on the general method of moments
(GMM-AB and GMM-BB). A problem with these estimators is that properties
do not hold for small panel data (small N and T ).8
Kiviet (1995) suggested an alternative approach to small panel data sets for
the estimation of dynamic models with just a lagged variable, such as model (8),
based on the correction of the bias of the LSDV model.
In a Monte Carlo analysis, Judson and Owen (1999) and Kiviet (1995) showed
that in typical aggregate dynamic panels characterized by T lower than or equal
to 20 and N lower or equal to 50, as in our case, the Anderson-Hsiao and the
Kiviet-corrected LSDV (LSDVC) estimators have better properties than the GMM
estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). Despite having a higher aver-
age bias, the corrected LSDV estimator turns out to be more e¢ cient than the
Anderson-Hsiao. This suggests that the corrected LSDV estimator is an e¤ective
approach for small panels (T  20), while the Anderson-Hsiao estimator is more
appropriate for large panels, as the e¢ ciency of the latter improves with T .
7For a discussion of this issue and for a presentation of econometric models for panel data see
Baltagi (2001).
8For a discussion of this issue, see Harris et al. (2008), p. 269.
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An alternative method to solve the endogeneity problem is the xed-e¤ects
two-stage least squares approach (FE2SLS) inspired by the original work of Balestra
and Nerlove (1966). This approach is discussed in detail in Baltagi (2001) and
applied by Baltagi and Gri¢ n (2002). The approach employs the within transfor-
mation and utilizes the exogenous variables and their lags as instruments. Obvi-
ously, the e¤ectiveness of the FE2SLS estimator critically depends on the quality
of the instruments adopted.
Our panel includes 20 regions for the period 2000   2009. Given the charac-
teristics of the panel, we choose the LSDVC and the FE2SLS estimators for our
myopic model of addiction dened by (8).9
For the estimation of the dynamic model in (7), the corrected LSDV estima-
tor is not completely appropriate. The reason is that this estimator is valid in
the presence of exogenous regressors only. To the extent that one-period forward
consumption (ait+1) is endogenous, as discussed in Becker et. al. (1994), the co-
e¢ cient of this variable is biased. This potential endogeneity problem, caused by
lagged and forward consumption, can be solved by the FE2SLS approach, as sug-
gested by Baltagi and Gri¢ n (2002). We consider lagged and lead values of price,
income, and other covariates as instruments for past and future consumption. We
then estimate Eqs. 7 and 8 using both the corrected LSDV and the FE2SLS ap-
proaches. We are fully aware that the estimation of (7) using the corrected LSDV
estimator could produce biased results.
3.1 Data
The balanced panel data set for the 20 Italian regions was created using several
sources. Data on regional outpatient antibiotic consumption, i.e., group J of the
Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical Classication (ATC) of drugs, were collected
from annual reports prepared by the Italian National Observatory on Drugs Uti-
lization (Osmed). The per capita consumption is measured by the number of
dened daily doses per 1000 inhabitants per day (DID). A dened daily dose
9Spatial aspects of consumption are not considered here. In a preliminary stage of this analysis
we estimated a spatial dynamic model following two approaches: the corrected 2SLS approach
suggested by Beenstock and Felsenstein (2007). However, the results were not encouraging. This
could be due to the fact that our data set is characterized by a low T and a low N.
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represents the standard dose necessary for one day of drug treatment in adults
and is dened by an independent scientic committee answering to the WHO
Collaborating Center for Drug Statistics Methodology. The DID measure can be
interpreted as the number of persons (out of 1000) who are taking antibiotics on
a given day.
Data on antibiotic consumption in Italy are available for the 10 years between
2000 and 2009. Summary statistics are provided in Table 1. The mean level of
antibiotic consumption during the period was 23:70 DID. Antimicrobials use
slightly increased over time, with a peak in 2009 (25:24) and a minimum in 2000
(22:36). A remarkable degree of heterogeneity in consumption is observed across
the regions. Generally, regions in central Italy use more antibiotics per capita
(25:12DID) than regions in the north (18:53DID) and less than southern regions
and the islands (28:99 DID).
As mentioned in Section 2.1, antibiotics are included in class A by the Italian
National Health Service (SSN), which means they require a doctors prescription
and are supplied virtually free of charge, in return for small patient co-payments.
Information on co-payments is obtained from annual reports on pharmaceutical
consumption and expenditure prepared by Osmed. Regional co-payments vary
from 0 to 4 Euros with a national average of 0:87 Euros.
Data on the demographic structure of the population and density, per capita
income, density of general practices, the number of working permits for immi-
grants, and the rate of infectious diseases are obtained from the Italian National
Institute of Statistics (Istat). Data on these covariates are available for 9 years,
between 2000 and 2008, with the exception of income and population density.
4 Results
In this section, we discuss the results obtained from the estimations of our models
of habit and addiction to antibiotics. For the myopic model, estimations are
carried out on the modied Equation 8, while the rational addiction model is
directly estimated on (7). Both models are estimated by means of the corrected
LSDV and the FE2SLS estimators discussed above. We summarize our ndings
in Table 2 for the myopic model and in Table 3 for the rational addiction model.
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The estimates are shown together with p-values of the test statistics and standard
errors. The number of observations used in the FE2SLS regressions is lower than
the number of observations used in the LSDVC regressions, since lead values of
explanatory variables are included among the set of instruments in the FE2SLS
approach. First-stage regressions on the instruments yield signicant joint F -tests
and exhibit high R2, 0:54 and 0:80, respectively for the myopic and the rational
addiction models. Finally, the p-value of the Sargan-test statistics does not reject
the null hypothesis and concludes that the overidentifying restriction is valid.
In the myopic model, the dynamics of antibiotic use is captured by the coef-
cient of the lagged variable of consumption, at 1. This is positive and highly
signicant in both the LSDVC and the FE2SLS regressions, which supports the
hypothesis of habit to antibiotic consumption. The coe¢ cient of income is also
signicant in the FE2SLS regression, at the 5% signicance level. In accordance
with the economic theory, we nd a statistically signicant and negative asso-
ciation between antibiotic consumption and co-payment, at least in the LSDVC
estimation, even though the impact is relatively low.
Using the coe¢ cient of co-payment we can calculate the short- and long-run
elasticities. Short- and long-run price elasticities ("t and "1) evaluated at the
means of the data (a and P ) can be calculated using the formulas derived by
Becker et al. (1994) in their Appendix A and applied in Baltagi and Gri¢ n
(2001, 2002). For the short-run elasticity "t = (dat=dPt)(P=a) with dat=dPt =
23=[1 22+(1 412)0:5], and for the long-run elasticity "1 = (da1=dP )(P=a)
with da1=dP = 3=(1  1   2). For the myopic model, we use these formulas
assuming that 2 is zero.
Short- and long- run elasticities for myopic consumers are  0:02 and  0:03,
respectively. The average long-run elasticity is approximately 1:5 times as large
as the short-run elasticity. Using a natural experiment across Italian regions,
Fiorio and Siciliani (2010) investigate the e¤ect of co-payments on drug prescrip-
tions. They nd that an increase in the co-payment by one Euro reduces the per
capita number of prescriptions by 4% and the per capita public pharmaceutical
expenditures by 3:4%.
As for the rational addiction model estimated using (7), we observe that the
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coe¢ cients of past and future consumption are signicant and positive in both
the LSDVC and the FE2SLS estimations, which rejects the myopic model in favor
of the rational addiction model. The rate of infections is also signicant at less
than 10% level in both regressions, while income is only signicant in the FE2SLS
regression at the 10% signicance level.
The coe¢ cients of the population below 14 (POP1) and above 74 (POP3) are
generally not signicant, with the exception of POP1 in the myopic LSDVCmodel.
Negative signs of these coe¢ cients may indicate that regions with a relatively large
proportion of younger and elderly individuals are less likely to use antibiotics,
ceteris paribus. The literature has suggested an increase in the utilization of
healthcare services as people grow older. However, this relationship nds very
weak support in some empirical studies (see, for instance, Di Matteo, 2005) as
well as in studies of antibiotic use. There are some plausible explanations for this.
First, individuals in the labor force may be more prone to use antibiotics because
of time pressure. Second, individuals may be more careful when giving antibiotics
to their children because of perceived risks. A similar consideration applies to
elderly individuals.
Following Baltagi and Gri¢ n (2001), we calculated the interest rate as r =
(1   )=; where  is the ratio between the estimated coe¢ cient of at+1 and the
estimated coe¢ cient of at 1, as shown by Equation 6 in Section 3. The estimated
coe¢ cients of the lag and lead variables of antibiotic consumption suggest that
the discount rate ( ) ranges from 0:88 in the corrected LSDV estimation to 0:92
in the FE2SLS approach. Accordingly, these gures indicate that the interest
rate (r) varies from 8:7% to 13:6%. Support for the rational addictive behavior
is reinforced by the positive and relatively close values of the interest rate. The
magnitude of these gures is not implausible since the discount factor is lower
than one, which gives positive interest rates.
The coe¢ cient of copayment is signicant in the corrected LSDV only, as in the
myopic model. This coe¢ cient could be biased, as explained above. Nevertheless,
we can calculate short- and long-run price elasticities for rational agents using
the formulas above. The short-run elasticity is around  0:05, while the long-run
elasticity is about  0:14. Elasticities are relatively low compared to estimated
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elasticities for cigarettes and alcohol consumption in many empirical studies. In
contrast to cigarettes and alcohol consumption, antibiotics are generally perceived
as being necessary and are purchased under a doctors advice. Moreover, at least
in the Italian healthcare system, consumers directly pay a small proportion of the
full price of antibiotics that has been relatively stable over time. This could imply
that consumers are not very sensitive to price changes.
The possible policy implication of smaller short-run rather that long-run co-
payment elasticities is that there is scope for raising revenues from increasing
co-payments on antibiotics in the short-run. Moreover, these gains are long
lived since the long-run elasticity is also relatively low. However, co-payments
on antibiotic use may not represent an e¤ective instrument to reduce antibiotic
consumption and control bacterial resistance. The low elasticity of demand for
antibiotics suggests that policy measures not targeted at antibiotic co-payments
may be more e¤ective in controlling antibiotic consumption. These measures may
include providing incentives and information to physicians and public campaigns
for promoting careful use of antibiotics targeted at consumers. A recent review
of public campaigns in high-income countries (Huttner et al., 2010) highlights
evidence that public campaigns have been successful in reducing antibiotic con-
sumption, but their e¤ects on bacterial resistance have not yet been accurately
assessed.
5 Conclusions
An improved understanding of the dynamics of antibiotic consumption may con-
tribute to the shaping of appropriate measures of public interventions to optimize
the use of antimicrobials. Recent theoretical studies on the economics of an-
tibiotics suggest that consumers make inter-temporal decisions. In this paper,
we proposed a dynamic approach to investigate antibiotic use in outpatient care,
which hypothesizes that antibiotic consumption is a¤ected by antibiotic ine¢ cacy,
i.e., the stock of bacterial resistance to antimicrobials.
We explored myopic and rational models of habit and addiction to antibi-
otics, which represents the main novelty of our analysis and provides a signicant
contribution to the existing empirical literature on antibiotic consumption. We
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found positive and signicant coe¢ cients of past and future consumption, which
supports the hypothesis of habit to antibiotic consumption and rejects the myopic
model in favor of the rational addiction model. Evidence of rational addiction is
reinforced by positive values of the interest rate.
As for policy implications, our results indicate that short- and long-run price
elasticity estimates are relatively low, at least for small co-payments such as those
in Italy. Therefore, increasing co-payments may not a¤ect antibiotic consumption
appreciably. Information provided by public campaigns about the future negative
e¤ects of antibiotic misuse targeting doctors and patients may, however, have a
signicant impact on the behavior of forward-looking consumers.
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LSDVC FE2SLS
Obs. 140 Obs. 120
Variables Coe¢ cients St. Err. p-value Coe¢ cients St. Err. p-value
Constant - - - 14.39705 13.60300 0.290
P -0.217246 0.095916 0.024 -0.065501 0.127598 0.608
Y 0.000193 0.000159 0.224 0.000585 0.000237 0.013
POP1 -0.706939 0.349829 0.043 -0.155507 0.541298 0.774
POP3 -0.606525 0.467679 0.195 -0.137834 0.838389 0.869
DPOP -0.035590 0.027385 0.194 -0.025877 0.036700 0.481
DPH 1.832944 4.422422 0.679 -3.736097 5.937115 0.529
INF -0.000861 0.000851 0.312 -0.001344 0.001046 0.199
IMM 0.342392 0.149850 0.022 -0.367148 0.247223 0.138
at 1 0.492594 0.092653 0.000 0.354114 0.166113 0.033
Notes: The instruments used in the FE2SLS regression are Pt, Yt, POP1t, POP3t, DPOPt, DPHt,
INFt, IMMt, and their one- and two-period lags and future values. First-stage regressions on the
instruments yield signicant joint F-tests. Moreover, the p-value of the Sargan-test statistics does not
reject the null hypothesis and concludes that the overidentifying restriction is valid.
Table 2: Parameter estimates of myopic models of habit to antibiotics.
LSDVC FE2SLS
Obs. 140 Obs. 120
Variables Coe¢ cients St. Err. p-value Coe¢ cients St. Err. p-value
Constant - - - 0.990672 14.05327 0.944
P -0.191576 0.086065 0.026 -0.121166 0.122829 0.324
Y 0.000008 0.000147 0.956 0.000437 0.000232 0.060
POP1 -0.269570 0.324759 0.407 0.400516 0.518027 0.938
POP3 -0.469742 0.426974 0.271 -0.367230 0.797943 0.645
DPOP -0.008220 4.034917 0.738 0.007821 0.037502 0.835
DPH 1.534188 0.170049 0.704 -0.490277 5.775167 0.932
INF -0.001320 0.000781 0.091 -0.002019 0.001029 0.050
IMM 0.206112 0.138807 0.138 -0.434565 0.235284 0.065
at 1 0.474151 0.078549 0.000 0.364383 0.156979 0.020
at+1 0.417266 0.080337 0.000 0.334489 0.141954 0.018
Notes: The instruments used in the FE2SLS regression are Pt, Yt, POP1t, POP3t, DPOPt, DPHt,
INFt, IMMt, and their one- and two-period lags and future values. First-stage regressions on the
instruments yield signicant joint F-tests. Moreover, the p-value of the Sargan-test statistics does not
reject the null hypothesis and concludes that the overidentifying restriction is valid.
Table 3: Parameter estimates of rational models of addiction to antibiotics.
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